The author is critical of russell's theory in that his "analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions is very defective" and has too many complications to serve as a "convention for a symbolic language.".

It may be seen from the foregoing that Pauline's existence is multiply jeopardized; or rather, that my right to use 'Pauline' as a name, the way I said I was going to, is very doubtful, for I agree with Parmenides that one cannot name what is not there to be named. The words I have used to describe Pauline's various perils are full of what Ryle aptly called "systematically misleading expressions"; but we need not worry about that for the moment-enough (...) for now if the words succeed in bringing the various cases before our minds--and we can tidy up our language as we come to see things more clearly. (shrink)

The author states: "in a recent article searle has shown the odd irrelevance of russell's criticisms of frege in the famous paper 'on denoting'. I here offer an explanation of the oddity: russell had excusably, But wrongly, Conflated frege's distinction between sinn and bedeutung with his own distinction between what an expression 'means' and what it 'denotes'.".

On his very first page Feldman ascribes to me a claim about the relation expressed by 'is identical with'. Feldman's way of speaking is, as Ryle might say, systematically misleading: for of course I deny that any one relation, even a relative relation, is the relation expressed by 'is identical with'. My whole thesis was that 'is identical with' expressed now one, now another, relation, according to the context of utterance.

The author criticizes black's formula in his "semantic definition of truth.".

The article is a reply to criticisms made by r m martin of the author's article "designation and truth." he claims that martin failed to observe that he was "attempting a reductio ad absurdum," and therefore, His conclusions about the author's article were misguided. (staff).

It would seem that Geach's claim is that the relation expressed by 'is identical with' is like the relation expressed by 'is better than', at least in one respect. If x and y are people, it may turn out that x is a better golfer than y, while y is a better poet than x. If we merely say that x is better than y, we fail to specify the respect in which we hold x to be the better. (...) Another way to put this is to say that we have not made clear "in relation to what" x is the better. We can call the relation expressed by 'is better than' a "relative relation," since an ordered pair of things may stand in that relation relative to one thing but not relative to another thing. Geach seems to think that identity is a relative relation. (shrink)

In this article, we present results from a literature review of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values of nature conducted for the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, as part of the Methodological Assessment of the Diverse Values and Valuations of Nature. We identify the most frequently recurring meanings in the heterogeneous use of different value types and their association with worldviews and other key concepts. From frequent uses, we determine a core meaning for each value type, which (...) is sufficiently inclusive to serve as an umbrella over different understandings in the literature and specific enough to help highlight its difference from the other types of values. Finally, we discuss convergences, overlapping areas, and fuzzy boundaries between different value types to facilitate dialogue, reduce misunderstandings, and improve the methods for valuation of nature's contributions to people, including ecosystem services, to inform policy and direct future research. © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Institute of Biological Sciences. (shrink)

What MacKinnon offers here is a provocative and original analysis of the meaning of the word "true." His applications are in the areas of statements in general, scientific theories, and theological propositions. One reason for the interest of the book can be found in MacKinnon’s intellectual odyssey. Setting out from a starting-point of standard neo-scholastic textbook philosophy and theology, MacKinnon has come to a highly personal synthesis to which he is willing at least tentatively to apply the label, "ontological pragmatism." (...) Stages along the way—and elements in the synthesis—include Bernard Lonergan’s transcendental Thomism, Wilfrid Sellars’ neo-Kantian version of analytical epistemology, and much detailed work of MacKinnon’s own in analytical philosophy of science. The provocative character of Truth and Expression is likely to bring criticism of the author for misuse of his sources. Wittgensteinian philosophical therapists are likely to bemoan MacKinnon’s relapse into ontologism, even if he qualifies it as a "pragmatic" version. Sellars is likely to object to being lumped with Lonergan, and the latter would probably be upset with the uses to which his former student has put his insights. It may also be worthwhile here to express a demur or two with respect to MacKinnon’s use of his Thomistic sources, e.g., concerning his theory of meaning. It seems that MacKinnon has accepted too naively what might best be called "textbook Thomism." It is true that Aquinas offers a mentalist view, and true also that both Aristotle and Aquinas speak of words as signs of concepts. While this can give rise to a private-language mentalism of the kind Wittgenstein would criticize, it must be recalled that Aristotle and Aquinas were writing not only before Wittgenstein but also before Kant. Whatever can be said of Aquinas’ "mentalism," it is certainly true that in other contexts Aquinas has a social theory of learning that is, at least on the surface, incompatible with a private language theory. Again, with respect to theological truth it seems likely that MacKinnon has been misled by Thomistic manuals, at least when he claims that what Aquinas offers is "a geometrically ordered deductive system" in which "the primacy of Jesus as a revelation of God does not fit." Historical studies of the function of his Summa Theologiae in Aquinas’ scheme for theological education do not support the view of Aquinas as a theological deductive system builder. Nor is it true, as MacKinnon seems to hold, that Aquinas’ view of theological truth is more Aristotelian than biblical. Aside from these qualifications on his use of sources, MacKinnon’s book offers an abundance of critical thinking, analytical insight, and systematic ability. For instance, the reader interested in MacKinnon’s original approach to an adequate epistemology of science will here, in chapter three of Truth and Expression, find the best summary yet of his many contributions in that area. Whether or not, in the last analysis, MacKinnon’s synthesis will be historically significant remains to be seen. What seems likely now is that if it does, the ingredient elements of Lonergen, [[sic]] Sellars, Wittgenstein, Quine, etc., will be more muted, and MacKinnon’s own synthesis will stand on its own. Meanwhile, Truth and Expression will serve as the best guide, pointing in the direction we can expect MacKinnon to follow in the future.—P. T. D. (shrink)

When I offered this title, I was engaging myself to investigate an apparent difference between two kinds of intentionality, in the hope that I should be able to find some firm logical criterion to distinguish them. I was less successful in this than I had hoped. I think I have gained a certain amount of insight into the logic and semantics of one kind of intentional context, largely due to the work I was doing while visiting the University of Pennsylvania (...) on Frege and on Michael Dummett’s monumental commentary on Frege. But as regards the other variety of intentionality I am still very much in the dark; so I am giving you thus far merely a progress report on that. (shrink)

It is fortunate for my purposes that English has the two words ‘almighty’ and ‘omnipotent’, and that apart from any stipulation by me the words have rather different associations and suggestions. ‘Almighty’ is the familiar word that comes in the creeds of the Church; ‘omnipotent’ is at home rather in formal theological discussions and controversies, e.g. about miracles and about the problem of evil. ‘Almighty’ derives by way of Latin ‘omnipotens’ from the Greek word ‘pantokratōr’; and both this Greek word, (...) like the more classical ‘pankratēs’, and ‘almighty’ itself suggest God's having power over all things. On the other hand the English word ‘omnipotent’ would ordinarily be taken to imply ability to do everything; the Latin word ‘omnipotens’ also predominantly has this meaning in Scholastic writers, even though in origin it is a Latinization of ‘pantocratōr’. So there already is a tendency to distinguish the two words; and in this paper I shall make the distinction a strict one. I shall use the word ‘almighty’ to express God's power over all things, and I shall take ‘omnipotence’ to mean ability to do everything. (shrink)

The Euthyphro might well be given to undergraduates to read early in their philosophical training. The arguments are apparently simple, but some of them, as I shall show, lead naturally on to thorny problems of modern philosophy. Another benefit that could be gained from reading the Euthyphro is that the reader may learn to be forewarned against some common fallacies and debating tricks in moral disputes.

‘Reference’ was the term Max Black and I chose to render Frege's term ‘ Bedeutung ’ when we published English translations of some selections from his works. We preferred ‘stand for’ as a translation of the verb ‘ bedeuten ’; but from ‘stand for’ we could not form a general term to render the corresponding German noun. Our renderings were chosen because, like the German words, they were in themselves colourless and untechnical, and on that very account could take on (...) in context whatever special import Frege's way of thinking might give them. Black ! and I could not foresee how the English language was going to develop. T Like another familiar English word, the word ‘gay’, ‘reference’ has S become the badge or slogan of a certain set of people; those who do not belong to the set but go on using the word as they always have done may find themselves on occasion seriously misunderstood. (shrink)

The Euthyphro might well be given to undergraduates to read early in their philosophical training. The arguments are apparently simple, but some of them, as I shall show, lead naturally on to thorny problems of modern philosophy. Another benefit that could be gained from reading the Euthyphro is that the reader may learn to be forewarned against some common fallacies and debating tricks in moral disputes.